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A priori, is there a growth/efficiency justification for government programs designed to 
support and promote national companies (public and private) as opposed to, and in 
competition with, opening the doors to multinational enterprises (MNEs)? In competitive 
markets, there should be no difference. Where national companies close in capabilities to 
foreign affiliates do not exist, foreign direct investment (FDI) may stimulate 
development, if a country is lucky enough to attract it. But in the imperfect markets that 
characterize the BRICs and other emerging markets, where foreign affiliates may crowd 
out excellent but inexperienced national firms, the question arises as to which type of 
enterprise policy makers should encourage for the long run. Historically, policy makers 
used tariffs to promote national firms (a “race to the bottom”). Today they use 
investments in science and technology (a “race to the top”). 
 
National firms are likely to be the more entrepreneurial of the two types because national 
firms know their local markets best.1 But foreign affiliates may have synergistic 
advantages from operating in more countries than the typical national firm. Still, in 
today’s global markets, there are eight relatively new functions that normally only 
national firms can perform, giving them a wide edge over foreign affiliates. More 
specifically, without private or public nationally owned enterprises to secure home 
markets: 
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• Supplying outsourcing services to developed countries is unrealistic. Outsourcers, by 
definition, look overseas for national firms to undertake production, especially in 
electronics (a US firm may establish its own affiliate as an outsourcer, but typically 
experienced national outsourcers are faster and more efficient). 
• Establishing brand names is very difficult (a brand name is company specific, and a 
company usually originates in a given country that has proprietary technology). 
• Dislodging a foreign legacy position in a natural resource industry like oil is undoable 
(to supplant a foreign concession, a domestic firm is required as demonstrated by 
OPEC members but not yet by Africa’s new oil-producing countries). 
• Reversing brain drain of top national talent is more difficult (a glass ceiling may 
obstruct nationals from reaching the position of CEO if a company is foreign-owned). 
• The illegality of imposing local content requirements under WTO law is binding. 
While foreign affiliates cannot be subjected to local content regulations, national 
enterprises have more incentive to build their own local supply chains and state-
owned enterprises can help in this respect via procurement. 
• The benefits of outward FDI undertaken by foreign affiliates located in the country 
ultimately accrue to the parent company at home. 
• Foreign affiliates conduct almost no research and development in emerging markets; 
so competing in high-tech industries is problematic, unless governments are able to 
take a hard line with foreign investors, as in India and China.  
• Small and especially medium-size enterprises must be brought up to speed as 
subcontractors, and FDI rarely makes a large impact in this firm-size range, which is 
the object of numerous government programs. 
 
There are other reasons to believe that the best national firms in the fastest growing 
emerging markets (for example, the Republic of Korea’s Samsung, India’s Infosys and 
Brazil’s Embraer) tend to be more entrepreneurial than foreign affiliates.2 The latter 
today are typically bureaucratic -- operating with relatively dense levels of management 
and cookie-cutting single models throughout the world. For now, when most national 
firms enjoy both family ownership and professional management, they display minimal 
bureaucracy. If a developing country relies on FDI, every “new” industry requires the 
entry of yet another MNE, whereas the conglomerate group, a typical national business 
structure in the de-colonized world, can diversify faster and at lower cost. 
 
The thin layer of bureaucracy in national firms, due to familial relations, improves 
information flows. National firms are often super-quick in entering new industries and 
then in designing the integration of parts and components to win the global race to 
market. One national firm in the Indian pharmaceutical industry reached the market faster 
than the Indian foreign affiliate of the MNE that had invented the drug.3 In many 
industries, national firms were the first movers. They diversified forcefully and fast -- the 
origin of the diversified business group structure. 
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All this suggests that research on FDI must change. In the past, FDI was compared with 
no FDI, as if national enterprise had nothing to contribute. Now, the presence or absence 
of foreign affiliates must be compared against that of well-managed national firms. How 
different the results will be remains to be seen, depending on policy formulation and 
implementation. National firms must be nursed and nurtured to fulfill the functions that 
foreign affiliates are less likely to undertake. There is little substitution. For this reason, 
specific institutions must be built to promote national assets. Good models in Asia are the 
Republic of Korea and China, and in the Middle East, many OPEC members. 
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